Chairman's Summary
Africa’s Forcibly Displaced: From Providing Aid to Ending Need

28-29 August 2019
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THE ASWAN FORUM

Acting in its capacity as the Chairman of the African Union (AU) and the Champion of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa, Egypt is taking the initiative to launch the Aswan Forum for Sustainable Peace and Development. Owned by Africa, and supported by international and regional partners, the Forum— to be held annually in December—is a high-level, multi-stakeholder platform that brings heads of states and governments, leaders from national governments, international and regional organizations, financial institutions, private sector, and civil society, together with visionaries, scholars, and prominent experts, for a context-specific, action-oriented, and forward-looking discussion on the opportunities, as well as the threats and challenges, facing the continent. It provides the first-of-its-kind platform in Africa to address the “peace-development nexus”, while championing African solutions to African problems, including through strengthening the links between policy and practice.

THE CAIRO INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEBUILDING

Founded in 1994, the Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCPA) is an Egyptian public agency; an AU Center of Excellence in training, capacity building and research; and the Arab world’s leading civilian training center on issues of peace and security. It is a major voice of the Global South on a wide range of topics, including conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, preventing radicalization and extremism leading to terrorism, combating transnational threats, and the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda.

PARTNERSHIP
Key Messages

- The 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Convention) and the 2009 AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) continue to provide an adequate basis for dealing with forced displacement in Africa. These are complemented by regional initiatives such as the Nairobi Declaration and Action Plan on Refugees, Returnees and Host Communities by IGAD. However, the scale and complexity of the current displacement crisis in Africa poses serious challenges to their national implementation.

- Current approaches to dealing with forced displacement fall short of providing solutions, let alone durable solutions, for the millions of forcibly displaced people and hosting communities in Africa.

- Forced displacement can no longer be seen as merely a humanitarian issue, but also as a developmental and a peace and security challenge, for which there are no stand-alone humanitarian solutions, but rather, a continuum of humanitarian, developmental and peace and security responses.

- In Africa, the imperative of addressing root causes and for resolving—rather than managing—situations of forced displacement by means of a nexus approach, is not only well understood, but also enshrined in key normative frameworks and policy documents.

- To bridge the response between immediate humanitarian needs and reducing longer term risk and vulnerability, the operationalization of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus (HDPN) is key.

- When “full jointness” is not possible, the nexus approach should not stand in the way of stand-alone humanitarian action.

- Preventing, responding to and resolving situations of forced displacement is the primary responsibility of states, in accordance with their national laws, and international and regional obligations. National leadership is paramount.

- The way peace agreements frame the conflict and address its root causes determines (i) how political priorities are set, and (ii) the principles that should guide an HDPN response to the host of issues resulting from forced displacement.

- A whole-of-government approach to dealing with forced displacement is key to the operationalization of the HDPN. This approach is not limited to central governments; it also includes local authorities, whose role as first responders and the interface for delivering integrated solutions, is key.

- The operationalization of the African Humanitarian Architecture (AfHA), including the African Humanitarian Agency, would represent a major boost to the continental response to forced displacement.

- The ongoing reform process of the AU presents a unique opportunity to advance synergies between the AfHA and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)—guided by an institutional paradigm shift from “conflict management” to “conflict prevention and sustaining peace”, including through addressing the root causes of forced displacement, inclusiveness and resilience building.

- Nationally led and owned processed needs to be complemented by efforts from partners along the security-development-humanitarian nexus, including development partners, humanitarian actors, civil society organizations and the private sector.
The central promise of the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) (to act as a vehicle for predictable and equitable burden and responsibility sharing) will be put to the test during and after the first Global Refugee Forum (GRF) in December 2019.

**Key Recommendations**

- The AU and its member states should continue to advocate and support the ratification, domestication and implementation of the OAU Convention, the Kampala Convention and related regional as well as national frameworks.
- To progressively reduce the burden of forced displacement in Africa, a paradigm shift to prevention and to resolving—rather than managing—situations of forced displacement, is imperative.
- Rather than merely coordinating efforts of various actors, the operationalization of the HDPN should—when possible—aim at achieving comprehensiveness, complementarity and coherence across the spectrum of humanitarian, development, peace and security efforts on the national, regional and international levels.
- To assume ownership, African countries should integrate displacement into their development plans. This provides governments with (i) a shared vision around which the actions of various actors can converge, and (ii) a basis for national resource allocation, establishing institutional structures, and engaging external actors.
- Comprehensive peace agreements must address a host of issues resulting from forced displacement in such a manner so as to reduce social tension, build social cohesion, extend state authority (without resorting to excessively securitized approaches), prevent conflict relapse and advance and implement the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU.
- The AU and its member states must ensure that the operationalization of the AfHA is an integral part of the ongoing AU reform, including, most notably, the ongoing APSA reforms.
- The AU and its member states must ensure that the creation and modalities of funding of the African Humanitarian Agency is complementary to similar organs of the AU, including, most notably, the African Peace Fund.
- The AfHA should make use of the elaborate operational and structural prevention toolbox developed by APSA, including, most notably, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessments (CSVRAs) and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS) and the AU Border Program.
- Partner countries and organizations should ensure that their support is sustained, predictable and flexible.
INTRODUCTION

The scale of the current forced displacement crisis is unprecedented. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 2018 Global Trends Report, the number of people fleeing ongoing or protracted conflicts, terrorism, persecution, climate change and natural disasters exceeded 70 million in 2018, almost one percent of the world’s population, of which 41.3 million were internally displaced persons (IDPs), 25.9 million were refugees, and 3.5 million were asylum seekers. This is the highest-recorded level in the last 70 years, double the level of 20 years ago, and 2.3 million more than just a year ago. And while the numbers are staggering, more important is the impact of forced displacement on people’s life trajectory, their livelihoods and their ability to fulfil their potential.

While forced displacement is a global problem, Africa continues to be disproportionately impacted. The continent accounts for one-third of refugees globally. According to UNHCR, 8 out of the 13 currently active refugee worldwide situations are in Africa, with the bulk of African refugee movements happening between neighboring countries within Africa. Out of the 10 countries with the highest refugee population relative to national population, 5 are in sub-Saharan Africa.

Acting in its capacity as the Secretariat of the Aswan Forum for Sustainable Peace and Development, the Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCPA)–in cooperation with the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and UNHCR–organized an expert workshop on 28-29 August 2019 in Cairo, Egypt, titled “Africa’s Forcibly Displaced: From Ad Hoc Responses to Durable Solutions”. Organized prior to the upcoming GRF, the workshop brought together humanitarian, development, and peace and security actors, from African and partner countries, the African Union Commission, international and regional organizations, financial institutions, civil society and think tanks.1

This report summarizes the key messages and recommendations emerging from the workshop discussions that addressed key issues, including the continued validity and adequacy of Africa’s normative and legal frameworks; the imperative for a paradigm shift from “providing aid” to “ending need”, including through the operationalization of the AfHA; and the need for meaningful “burden- and responsibility-sharing”.

Africa’s Normative and Legal Framework: Fit for Purpose?

To bring global visibility to forced displacement in Africa, African Heads of States and Governments declared 2019 the “Year of Refugees, Returnees, and Internally Displaced Persons”. This coincides with the commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the OAU Convention, and the 10th Anniversary of the Kampala Convention.

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1 Participants included officials from African countries (Djibouti, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, and Tunisia); partner countries (UK, Canada, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland); representatives of the African Union Commission (Departments of Political Affairs and Peace and Security), the AU Special Rapporteur on Refugees, IDPs, and Migrants; Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), as well as UNHCR, UNHCR’s Regional Liaison Office to the African Union and the UN Economic Commission for Africa, United Nations Development Programme, International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Peacebuilding Support Office, United Nations Children’s Fund, World Bank, African Development Bank, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Institute of Security Studies, and the African Union Mission in Somalia.
While an opportunity to celebrate and recommit to the values and standards enshrined in these legal instruments, commemorating the Conventions is also an opportunity to take stock of the progress achieved to date. It is also an opportunity to address persisting and new challenges, with a view to proposing concrete recommendations to address, resolve, and, when possible, prevent, forced displacement in Africa.

Africa’s response to forced displacement has been both deliberate and principled. Since 1969, the continent has pioneered global efforts, with the OAU Convention being instrumental to the evolution of the continent’s refugee policy. Ratified by 46 countries, the Convention provided the basis for the “open door policy” adopted by many African countries. It also broke new ground by broadening the definition of “refugee” and informing the _prima facie_ recognition of refugees. In addition, it provided a template for the principle of “burden and responsibility sharing”, adopted 50 years later by the GCR.

For its part, the Kampala Convention is the first legally binding international instrument of its kind to address internal displacement; a significant step forward in protecting the rights of IDPs. Thanks to the Kampala Convention, several countries have passed legislation and created government entities and mechanisms that specifically focus on IDPs; others are following suit.

While the two Conventions continue to provide an adequate basis for dealing with forced displacement in Africa, their national implementation is facing a number of challenges. On one hand, 8 African countries are yet to ratify the OAU Convention, while only 28 have ratified the Kampala Convention\(^2\). The AU and its member states should therefore continue to advocate for ratification of the Conventions by the remaining states, as well as support their domestication and implementation by all states, including through technical assistance and capacity building.

On the other hand, faced by the magnitude, complexity and protracted nature of the current refugee crisis in Africa—and the enormous pressures it imposes on host countries and communities—some countries are resorting to refoulement (in violation of Article 5 of the OAU Convention). Others are adopting restrictive policies and measures on the movement of refugees, based largely on the perception of refugees as a security threat\(^3\) and a socioeconomic burden.

The rising number of IDPs presents Africa with additional challenges. Having to deal with 17 million IDPs (more than double the number of refugees in Africa) poses additional pressure on the already limited resources of many African countries. Moreover, and despite the Kampala Convention, some African countries treat “return” as the only viable solution for IDPs, even when local integration might be a better option. This often results in premature and forced return, which undermines the principles of safe, voluntary and dignified return of IDPs.

Another major challenge facing the implementation of the Conventions is declining international support, with UNHCR reporting only 55 percent of its 2018 funding needs covered. Protracted refugee situations have been hit the hardest as a result of this funding gap. In that regard, by reiterating the 50-year old principle of burden and responsibility sharing of the OAU

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\(^2\) Competing priorities, national politics, and/or the low number of IDPs have kept the remaining African countries from ratifying the Convention.

\(^3\) Especially the growing narrative on a link between mass movement of people and extremism leading to terrorism, despite the anecdotal evidence in this regard.
Convention, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, the GCR, and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), can be a game changer. The ability of the upcoming GRF to deliver on the GCR’s central promise (to act as a vehicle for predictable and equitable burden and responsibility), will represent a major boost to the implementation of the OAU Convention.

**From Delivering Aid to Ending Need**

Forced displacement in Africa is a multidimensional and multifaceted problem. It is driven by a myriad of complex, and often overlapping factors, including conflict, persecution, terrorism, climate change, natural disasters, and health emergencies.

Conflict (and more recently, terrorism), however, continues to be the leading driver of forced displacement in Africa, creating the majority of humanitarian appeals that remain unfunded. The protracted nature of today’s conflicts leads to prolonged displacement experiences, which in turn creates a vicious cycle of instability and forced displacement.

Current approaches to dealing with forced displacement fall short of providing solutions for the millions of forcibly displaced people in Africa. On one hand, while recognizing people’s right to leave on their own accord, and that displacement is often the only coping/life-saving strategy in the face of the conflict, persecution, terrorism, human rights violations, and natural or man-made disasters, prevention, by means of addressing root causes, continues to be underutilized.

On the other hand, and despite some progress in enhancing refugees’ self-reliance through expanding their socioeconomic opportunities, other “durable solutions” continue to be elusive. “Return”—which is often considered the preferred solution—continues to be blocked by the protracted nature of conflicts and crises. Local integration is hampered by lack of political will, weak economic development, or resource and capacity constraints; a problem further exacerbated by perceptions of refugees as a security concern and an economic burden. Third-country solutions are available to no more than the 1 percent of the forcibly displaced—a figure that is unlikely to increase in the current political and economic environment. Complementary pathways (education scholarships, legal labor mobility schemes, family re-unification, etc.) are a new and yet fully untapped solution potential.

To progressively reduce the burden of forced displacement in Africa, a paradigm shift to preventing and resolving—rather than managing—situations of forced displacement is long overdue. Today, there is growing recognition that forced displacement is not just a humanitarian issue, but also a developmental and a peace and security challenge, for which there are no stand-alone humanitarian solutions; rather a continuum of humanitarian, developmental and peace and security responses.

In Africa, the imperative of addressing root causes and for resolving—rather than managing—situations of forced displacement, by means of a nexus approach, is not only well understood, but also enshrined in key normative frameworks and policy documents. For example, anchored in Agenda 2063, the 2016 Common African Position (CAP) on Humanitarian Effectiveness highlights in unmistakable terms that “life-saving humanitarian assistance is necessary, yet
unsustainable [...] and reaffirm[s] the need to address the continent’s deep-rooted problems through holistic interventions that cut across humanitarianism, development and peacebuilding.”

Internationally, the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit endorsed the New Way of Working (NWOW) as a means of bridging the response between immediate humanitarian needs and reducing longer term risk and vulnerability through the HDPN\(^4\). The sustaining peace twin resolutions\(^5\) identified insecurity as a major driver of vulnerability and called on all actors to bring prevention to the fore, by addressing the root causes of conflict, and to work together to achieve sustainable development and peace. The 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda’s commitment to leaving no one behind, and its specific reference to people affected by humanitarian emergencies, created “a common results framework under which both humanitarian and development actors are able to work together.” The GCR provided a platform which—for the first time—brought together all relevant humanitarian and development actors and stakeholders (but not peace and security actors), including local governments, the private sector, financial institutions, and civil society\(^6\).

While not entirely new, the nexus approach goes further than any previous discussions. Rather than merely coordinating efforts of various actors, the HDPN aims at achieving comprehensiveness, complementarity and coherence across the spectrum of humanitarian, development, peace and security efforts. Assuming the willingness and ability of various actors, it can contribute to creating a conducive environment that leverages the complementary mandates, expertise and resources to pursue collective outcomes, on the national, regional and international levels.

How the HDPN is operationalized in practice is a question of context. In some contexts, actions of the various actors should be “distinct but complementary”. In others, it should be “merged but principled.”\(^7\) In all cases, it should be based, first and foremost, on the needs of the forcibly displaced and host communities, but aim at ending need, by resolving—not managing—situations of forced displacement. In other words, when “full jointness” is not possible, the nexus approach should not stand in the way of stand-alone humanitarian action.

Preventing, responding and resolving situations of forced displacement is the responsibility of states, in accordance with their national laws, and international and regional obligations. According to the CAP on Humanitarian Effectiveness, the first pillar is “primary responsibility of the states”. It is not only important; it is indispensable. Even in situations of protracted conflict and crises, where the state is incapable or unwilling to provide services, bridging the gap between meeting immediate needs and reducing long term vulnerability should give due attention to gradually building the state’s capacity to carry out its roles and fulfill its international and regional obligations, which is key to ensuring sustainability.

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\(^4\) Internationally, the Syrian Crisis acted as a catalyst for a global reflection on the humanitarian architecture and its inability to cope with a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex humanitarian landscape.

\(^5\) General Assembly resolution 70/262 and Security Council resolution 2282 (2016)

\(^6\) In Syria, UNHCR and the United Nations Development Programme came together to co-lead a response through the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), including 200 partners in a country-led coordinated platform that has been viewed as a model to be replicated.

\(^7\) IOM - Operationalizing the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus: Lessons from Colombia, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and Turkey, 2019.
A first essential step for assuming national ownership and for operationalizing the nexus is integrating displacement (and migration) into national development plans, based on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). National development plans, coupled with the necessary legislative and policy reforms, provide governments with a shared vision around which the actions of various actors, on both the central and local levels, can converge. They also provide a basis for national resource allocation, establishing institutional mechanisms and structures, building requisite capacities, and engaging external actors—all in a sustainable manner.

In countries emerging from conflicts, comprehensive peace agreements are a key enabler of an HDPN approach. The way peace agreements frame the conflict and address its root causes determines (i) how political priorities are set, and (ii) which principles will guide an HDPN response to the host of issues that result from forced displacement. These include physical security of the forcibly displaced/returnees, documentation, housing and land rights, access to education, employment opportunities, capital and justice, etc. Addressing these issues in peace agreements helps reduce social tension (especially when return, for example, is not to communities of origin), builds social cohesion, extends state authority [without resorting to excessively securitized approaches (freeing resources in the process)], prevents conflict relapse and advances and implements the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU.

A whole-of-government approach at the national and local levels is key to the operationalization of the HDPN. Coordination mechanisms—with the mandate, powers and resources to take up the task of preventing, responding and resolving situations of forced displacement—are essential. A whole-of-government approach is not limited to central governments; it also includes local authorities, whose role as first responders and the interface for delivering integrated solutions, is key. Inclusive institutions and effective rule of law is not only essential to improving safety, but also to addressing grievances.

Joint analysis, planning and programming that target—when possible—collective outcomes, are key to the operationalization of the HDPN. All actors and stakeholders across the spectrum of humanitarian protection and assistance, transition, recovery peacebuilding and long-term development, should systematically apply a fragility lens to analysis (including on the subnational level). Such analysis is critical for planning and programmatic design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation.

The needs of refugees, IDPs, returnees and host communities, as they see them, should be the basis of interventions across the HDPN. Actions should be planned through a participatory process that engages all actors and relevant stakeholders, including most notably the displaced populations and host communities, civil society organizations, as well as the private sector.

Context-specificity and customization are key to ensuring high-impact and better outcomes. Needs differ from one village to another; one neighborhood to the other. They differ between men and women; between rural and urban areas; and between generations. There are also intergenerational differences. Interventions must be based on a context-specific analysis of the risks, needs, vulnerabilities, and root causes of forced displacement. A gender-sensitive approach must be adopted throughout the process, including analysis, planning, design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation.
State leadership should go hand in hand with a whole-of-society approach, which engages all relevant actors and stakeholders on the national and local levels, including most notably the forcibly displaced themselves, as well as the host communities. Interventions must leverage the pillars of resilience and indigenous structures and capacities for conflict and displacement prevention and management.

**Operationalizing the AU Humanitarian Architecture**

The CAP on Humanitarian Effectiveness (drafted for the purposes of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit) outlined an ambitious vision for enhancing the humanitarian effectiveness of the AU and its member states. It called for the establishment and operationalization of the AfHA, to effectively respond to humanitarian crises on the continent.

An African Humanitarian Agency (expected to be operational in 2020) will be the main vehicle for the new African architecture, as well as its operational arm. Premised on the principle of providing African solutions to African humanitarian problems, the Agency’s stated objectives include: (1) strengthening African states’ role as the primary actors in Africa’s humanitarian action; (2) reducing Africa’s external dependency on humanitarian assistance and encouraging self-reliance; (3) encouraging deliberate efforts towards addressing durable solutions that link humanitarian action to long-term socioeconomic development within the framework of Agenda 2063; and (4) ensuring a more structured coordination among national, regional, continental and international humanitarian actors for purposes of complementarity and reducing duplication.

While judging an institutional structure that is yet to become operational is impossible, it is clear that the Agency, and the new humanitarian architecture more broadly, will have to overcome multiple challenges. One major challenge is that of ensuring sustainable, predictable and flexible financing. Current plans call for the establishment of an AU Humanitarian Fund, which will be financed primarily through contributions from member states. At face value, this ensures African ownership, which is laudable, but at the same time it casts serious doubts about the ability of the Agency to secure the funds needed for dealing with the enormity, complexity and frequency of Africa’s humanitarian crises.

The experience of the African Peace Fund confirms these concerns. Established in 1993, the Peace Fund is—only in theory—the principal financing instrument for the peace and security activities of the African Union (and its predecessor the OAU). Despite being one of APSA’s five pillars, and a decision by the AU Assembly of Heads of States and Governments to endow it with $400 million through member states’ contributions (drawn from an 0.2 percent levy instituted to finance the overall AU budget), it is highly unlikely that the full endowment level will be reached by 2021, as planned. Moreover, creating an additional fund, also financed by member states’ contributions, would not only result in unwarranted competition between the two AU structures, but would also create—rather than break—silos between AfHA and APSA, as emphasized in the CAP on Humanitarian Effectiveness, as well as the APSA Roadmap (2016-2020).

The Roadmap noted that “migration and refugee issues relate to all strategic priorities of the Roadmap,” and that during implementation “efforts must be undertaken to address the
relationship between displacement, migration and peace and security.” Similarly, the Master Roadmap on Practical Steps to Silence the Guns by 2020, highlighted the importance of “addressing the plight of internally displaced people and refugees and eliminating the root causes of this phenomenon by fully implementing continental and universal frameworks.”

The operationalization of the AfHA must therefore be closely coordinated with the ongoing work of other AU architectures. Over the years, APSA has grown into an elaborate toolbox of operational, and more recently, structural prevention. On the operational level, the AU’s CEWS, and similar structures in Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs), can help detect signs of a crisis and draw a clear picture that helps policymakers to anticipate, respond, and manage crises. Incorporating humanitarian indicators, for data collection and analysis, would represent an important operational bridge between APSA and AfHA.

In terms of structural prevention, an important–yet almost completely unutilized–instrument of the AU is the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF). This includes Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessments (CSVRAs) and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS). These tools facilitate the identification of a country’s structural vulnerabilities at an early stage, and develop the strategies to deal with them, with an emphasis on the drivers of violent conflict, covering a wide range of issues (political, socioeconomic, governance, security, environmental, etc.)

The AU Border Programme is also devised as a tool for structural prevention. It seeks to create the conditions that help prevent conflicts and disputes from arising, and in case they do, do not turn violent. The program provides an important instrument to develop border institutions and areas through effective border governance, based on the principle of cross-border cooperation. This includes any program that promotes good neighborly relations between border communities (socioeconomic development, cultural exchange, security cooperation, etc.). It is an effective tool for prevention since border communities are usually the host communities.

The ongoing reform process of the AU presents a unique opportunity to advance these synergies between AfHA and APSA, guided by an institutional paradigm shift from “conflict management” to “conflict prevention and sustaining peace”, including through addressing the root causes of forced displacement. The reform process should not just be about merging Political Affairs with the Peace and Security Department, and Humanitarian Affairs with the Department of Social Affairs– it should be regarded as an opportunity for strategic reflection and organizational restructuring. Major milestones on the horizon, such as declaring 2020 as the “Year of Silencing the Guns in Africa”, provide additional momentum for advancing this organization-wide paradigm shift.
Burden Sharing; Not Burden Shifting

With 84 percent of refugees hosted by developing countries, comes the notion of “differentiated contributions”. Many African host countries, already struggling to achieve the SDGs and create economic opportunities for their own nationals, are also confronted with the flow of refugees, which presents them with additional challenges. Stark examples in that regard include the Central African Republic and Somalia, which despite having their own complex security and developmental challenges, are themselves host nations for refugees.

Finding “comprehensive solutions” for the millions of Africa’s forcibly displaced is also a function of international solidarity. Despite the global recognition of the need for more equitable, sustainable and predictable burden and responsibility sharing, and the many forums for advancing it, the world’s response to forced displacement remains inadequate and underfunded, leaving refugees and host nations to shoulder most of the burden. And while the number of donor countries have increased, and new and non-traditional donors have started to be involved, only a fraction of appeals are being met. Pledges are delayed well beyond the time when they are needed.

In this regard, and notwithstanding the legitimate concerns of many countries regarding irregular migration, the narrow focus on issues, such as search and rescue, disembarkation, and offshore processing centers, limits the response to the needs of the few who try to leave Africa, oftentimes at the expense of the many that stay. Moreover, measuring the impact of hosting refugees for purposes of burden and responsibility sharing must take into consideration that the impact of protecting and hosting refugees is not limited to the fiscal impact on national budgets, but also includes broader macroeconomic, political, social, security and environmental impacts, that are difficult to quantify.

The GCR can be a major step forward in advancing burden and responsibility sharing. It reflects “the political will and ambition of the international community as a whole for strengthened cooperation and solidarity with refugees and affected host countries.” This promise will be put to the test during and after the first GRF.

To pass this test, a clearer understanding of what burden and responsibility sharing entails is imperative. For example, the GCR concurrently refers to the terms “responsibility sharing,” “burden sharing,” and “international cooperation,” without making a distinction between them. States use different terminology that reflect their context, approaches and interests. For some, responsibility sharing is understood as the responsibility of states to end the need of the forcibly displaced on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common yet differentiated responsibilities and capacities. In others, responsibility sharing is perceived through the narrow lens of providing resettlement opportunities and financial contributions. Such definitions of responsibility sharing do not reflect the contributions made by host states, their changing capacities to provide protection and the changing nature of the movement of the forcibly displaced. This is particularly true in the African context, where many countries are not only host states, but also states of origin.
Equitable re-distribution of responsibility requires developing an agreed upon methodology to assess the equity and fairness of responsibility sharing. One challenge with regards to measuring responsibility is equivalency of the different contributions made to the forcibly displaced, for example, financial contributions vis-à-vis the contributions of host states in terms of protection and access to services. This is compounded by the lack of data; there are currently no statistics that covers all contributions, including “humanitarian assistance, development assistance, non-governmental and private sector contributions.” Related, measuring the impact of financial contributions and varying state capacities in terms of providing protection and solutions remains a challenge.

Involving the forcibly displaced along the HDPN is key to opening up new windows for responsibility sharing and enhancing protection and operationalization of durable solutions. Refugees should be increasingly involved in broader development, governance and migration initiatives beyond the international refugee regime. The Jordan Compact, for example, provided Jordan aid and concessional loans in exchange for providing work permits and education opportunities for Syrian refugees. As part of this agreement, the European Union (EU) also relaxed tariffs to stimulate exports to the EU in exchange for Jordan’s business to employ Syrian refugees.

Harnessing the contributions of new actors to provide comprehensive solutions for forced displacement is also key. The increased attention given by the World Bank through its International Development Association (IDA) 18 sub-regional window for funding refugee and host communities in lower-income countries is a good example. The role of AfDB is key in supporting and complementing ongoing efforts to create conditions conducive to voluntary return, as well as to support prevention efforts.

The AfDB’s Strategy on Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience focuses on 3 areas: 1) strengthening state capacity and supporting effective institutions; 2) promoting resilient societies through inclusive and equitable access to employment, basic services and shared benefits from natural resource endowments; and 3) supporting deeper policy dialogue, partnership and advocacy around issues of fragility through the Bank’s convening role.

Prevention and durable solutions also require long term funding. AfDB’s Transition Support Facility (TSF), is a fast, simple and flexible disbursement mechanism designed to help countries in transition (i) consolidate peace, (ii) build resilient institutions, (iii) stabilize their economies, and (iv) lay the foundations for inclusive growth (improving the quality of life of the vulnerable population). AfDB has supported projects that benefit refugees, IDPs and host communities that complement the ongoing activities of other actors, such as UNHCR. AfDB also goes beyond catering for the immediate needs of both the host communities and the forcibly displaced by building the response capacity of state institutions and implementing programs and projects designed around the need for inclusiveness and sustained resilience, including the promotion of private sector. The Bank focuses on strict selectivity and prioritization of its interventions, which derives from a better understanding of the situation on the ground following the conduct of a rigorous context analyses. Moreover, the flexibility of the AfDB’s TSF allows for partnerships with other stakeholders, including channelling funds from partners towards African countries in

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transition (in fragile situations). One example in that regard is the contribution of the Italian government to TSF for "Addressing Drivers of Fragility within the broader Economic Migration and Forced Displacement Agenda". Moreover, the TSF facilitates private sector development through various risk mitigation instruments such as Partial Credit and Partial Risk Guarantees, among others, where AfDB can provide advisory services on a case by case basis.

In general, sustained, predictable and flexible funding is key to resolving situations of forced displacement in Africa and easing the burden on host countries. Flexible and unearmarked funding is also key to achieving another important policy objective, namely a “one refugee approach” that guarantees an end to discrimination between refugees from different countries of origin in terms of international assistance and programing. Flexible funding is also necessary to reach the most vulnerable in protracted refugee situations.

Restructuring of existing funding modalities is also imperative for more equitable and fair responsibility sharing. This would necessitate a shift from voluntary contributions by donors for humanitarian crises to ensuring the known costs of current forced displacement and refugee situations are guaranteed through payment. For example, UNHCR funding structure continues to be dependent on voluntary contributions from states.

While the search for new partnerships is important, considerable focus should also be given to maximizing impact and ensuring accountability for available resources. In this regard, better coordination between donors is key (to overcome donors’ fatigue among other issues).

Translating the aspirations for more effective burden and responsibility sharing to tangible outcomes also requires increased commitment to resettlement and complementary pathways, particularly where safe return is not a viable option. It is thus imperative to implement the three-year Strategy developed by UNHCR in this regard, to expand third-country solutions. The GRF will be key in testing the international community’s resolve to respond to increasing resettlement needs against the backdrop of declining resettlement opportunities. Local integration should also be provided in accordance with state capacities.

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9 For example: Loans should be replaced by in-kind contributions to provide protection for refugees.